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Résumé
Le Protocole de Kyoto, entré en vigueur en février 2005, autorise les pays signataires à recourir
à des activités supplémentairespermettant en particulier la séquestration de carbone dans les sols.
Les travaux existants qui étudient la sequestration optimale de carbone reconnaissent limportance
du processus temporel de séquestration, mais négligent le fait que ce processus est dissymétrique. Ce
papier prend en compte explicitement la dynamique de la séquestration. Sa première contribution est
technique : nous résolvons un problème de contrôle optimal à deux phases et processus dynamique dis-
symétrique. Sa seconde contribution est empirique : nous montrons que lerreur commise en supposant
la séquestration immédiate peut être très signicative, et simulons le sentier optimal de séquestration
/ déséquestration pour des fonctions de bénéce, de dommage et de coût particulières.
Codes JEL : C61, H23, Q01, Q15
Mots clés : environnement, agriculture, séquestration de carbone, Protocole de Kyoto, contrôle
optimal.
Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol, which came in force in February 2005, allows countries to resort to sup-
plementary activities consisting particularly in carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. Existing
papers studying the optimal carbon sequestration recognize the importance of the temporality of
sequestration, but overlook the fact that it is a dissymmetric dynamic process. This paper takes ex-
plicitely into account the temporality of sequestration. Its rst contribution is technical: we solve an
optimal control problem with two stages and a dissymmetric dynamic process. The second contribu-
tion is empirical: we show that the error made when sequestration is supposed immediate can be very
signicant, and we exhibit numerically the optimal path of sequestation / de-sequestration for specic
benet, damage and cost functions, and a calibration that mimics roughly the world conditions.
JEL Classication: C61, H23, Q01, Q15
Keywords: Environment, agriculture, carbon sequestration, Kyoto Protocol, optimal control.
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1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol, ratied by the European countries in 2002 and in force from February 2005, allows
countries to resort to supplementary activities consisting in the sequestration of carbon in forests
and in agricultural soils (Articles 3.3 and 3.4). The emissions trapped by such volontary activities,
set up after 1990, can be deduced from the emissions of greenhouse gas. They can be the result of
a¤orestation projects (Article 3.3) or of changes of practices in the agricultural and forestry sectors
(Article 3.4). As far as this last article is concerned, the list of eligible activities proposed by the IPCC
gives appreciable opportunities of reduction of emissions to countries possessing signicant surfaces of
agricultural land. For example, gross French emissions of greenhouse gas were estimated at 148 MtC
in 2000. France emits low levels of GHG per capita and will encounter di¢ culties in further reducing
its emissions, in part because of the importance of French nuclear energy generating capacity. Given
the area of land devoted to agriculture, the prospects opened by Article 3.4 may be of interest for the
French policy of greenhouse gas mitigation. The French National Institute for Agricultural Research
has recently estimated the potential additional carbon storage for the next 20 years, between 1 and 3
MtC/year, for the whole of mainland France (INRA (2002)). This potential is equivalent to 1 to 2%
of annual French greenhouse gas emissions, a large proportion of the e¤orts required to comply with
the commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. At the European level, this potential is estimated at 1.5
to 1.7% of the EU-15 anthropogenic CO2 emissions during the rst commitment period (European
Climate Change Program (2003)).
The Bonn Agreement (COP6bis) in July 2001 claries the implementation of Article 3.4: eligible
activities in agriculture comprise cropland management, grazing land management and reve-
getation, provided that these activities have occured since 1990 and are human-induced. Carbon
sequestration can occur either through a reduction in soil disturbance (zero tillage or reduced tillage,
set-aside land, growth of perennial crops...) or through an increase of the carbon input to the soil
(animal manure, sewage sludge, compost...). Switching from conventional arable agriculture to other
land-uses with higher carbon input or reduced disturbance can also increase the soil carbon stock
(conversion of arable land to grassland or woodland, organic farming...).
Lal et al. (1998) provide estimates of the carbon sequestration potential of agricultural manage-
ment options in the USA. A few studies present estimations of agricultural soil carbon sequestration
potentials for EU-15 (see European Climate Change Programme (2003)), and one study does the
same for France (INRA (2002)). They all show that soil carbon sequestration is a non-linear process.
Increases in soil carbon are often greatest soon after a land use or land management change is im-
plemented. There is also a sink saturation e¤ect: as the soil reaches a new equilibrium, the rate of
change decreases, so that after 20 to 100 years a new equilibrium is reached and no further change
takes place. Moreover, by changing agricultural management or land-use, soil carbon is lost more
rapidly than it accumulates (Smith et al. (1996), INRA (2002)). Carbon de-sequestation is far faster
than sequestration or, to put it di¤erently, carbon storage in agricultural soils takes far more time
than carbon release (the unit of measure of the storage time is tens of years, the one of release is years,
see INRA (2002)).
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The aim of this paper is to study the optimal policy of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils.
While many technical papers try to quantify the potential of carbon sequestration, there are very few
papers studying the optimal path of carbon sequestration. To the best of our knowledge, the paper by
Feng, Zhao and Kling (2002) is the only one. But their dynamic representation of the process is limited
by the assumption that the sequestration potential of a unit of land on which a change in land use or
land management takes place is instantaneously obtained. Technical papers recognize the importance
of the temporality of sequestration, and we take in this paper this temporality explicitely into account.
Moreover, we also take into account the fact that sequestration is a dissymmetric dynamic process,
which most experts in the eld of agriculture consider determining (INRA (2002)). Anyhow, the
question is: what should the dissymmetry of the process be important at all? The answer to this
question is obvious in a decentralized framework, where agents can be incited to sequester carbon
by an appropriate policy, and then be incited to stop using the sequestering practices if the policy is
not permanent. In the case of the optimal policy that we study here, temporary sequestration could
be optimal if the terms of the trade-o¤ between emissions abatement and carbon sequestration in
order to reduce the stock of carbon in the atmosphere change in the course of time. These terms
could change because of a technical progress enhancing the possibilities of abatement, or because of
the characteristics of the dynamic process of sequestration / de-sequestration. We focus here on the
second possibility.
We adapt the Feng, Zhao and Klings (2002) model to take into account explicitly the dynamics
of the sequestration process. The main characteristics of the model are the following. The economic
activity causes carbon emissions that accumulate in the atmosphere. Benets are associated to this
emissions or, equivalently, emissions reduction is costly , and damages to the atmospheric carbon
stock. Sequestration has a cost, depending on how much land is devoted to it. When a change of
practice occurs on a unit of land in order to enhance its carbon sequestration, it stores its potential
gradually; when the unit of land returns to the usual practice, it releases carbon more rapidly than
it has stored it. The total amount of land on which a change of practice can take place is bounded
from above. In the same way, at each date, the amount of new land that can be used to store carbon
is bounded from above, as well as the amount of land that can go back to the usual practice. This
assumption expresses in a simple way the existence of adjustment costs and of physical limits to the
land-use changes. The sequestration / de-sequestration process is supposed irreversible, in the sense
that it is impossible to sequester again on a unit of land that has already been used for sequestration
and then went back to the usual practice. The problem is then to nd at each date the optimal
carbon emissions and the amount of land newly devoted to sequestration or de-sequestration, subject
to the evolution of the carbon and land stocks and of the constraints. We characterize analytically
the di¤erent possible solutions. Then, we calibrate the model and make numerical simulations that
allow us to compare our solutions to the ones obtained when the dynamics and the dissymmetry of
the process are not taken into account.
Section 2 presents the modelling of the sequestration / de-sequestration process. Section 3 is
devoted to the exposition and the analytical resolution of the dynamic optimization problem taking the
temporality and the dissymmetry of this process into consideration. In section 4, numerical simulations
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allow us to exhibit the optimal path of carbon sequestration, for specic benet of emissions, damage
and cost of sequestration functions, and to compare it with the path obtained when sequestration and
de-sequestration are taken to be immediate. Section 5 concludes.
2 The dynamics of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils
The total amount of agricultural land is supposed to be B; constant over time and exogenous. Land
is homogeneous and produces a unique agricultural good. The di¤erent units of land may however
di¤er according to the agricultural practices used on them. Two types of practices are distinguished:
the usualpractice and a sequesteringpractice, allowing land to store more carbon. All units of
land are supposed to be initially cultivated with the usual practice.
Physical studies clearly show that additional sequestration is a non-linear process: it is high in
the rst years following the change of practice, then decreases and tends towards zero as the new
equilibrium is approached. We adopt here, following the results of Hénin and Dupuis (1945), an
exponential approximation of the sequestration process.
The maximal amount of carbon that can be stored in a unit of lands soil is cs. Let cs(t; z)
represent the amount of carbon in the soil at date t for a change of practice taking place at date
z, and cs0 the amount of carbon stored with the usual practice (cs > cs0  0). The dynamics of
sequestration in a unit of land is then
cs(t; z) = cs + (csn   cs)e s(t z); t  z; (1)
where s > 0 is the parameter of speed of the sequestration process.
Let us now consider a unit of land returning to the usual practice at date & after having experienced
the rst change of practice at date z. cs(&; z) is the amount of carbon that the sequestering practice
has allowed the land to store until date &, and cs(t; &; z) the amount of carbon remaining in the soil
at date t: We have
cs(t; &; z) = csn + (cs(&; z)  csn)e s0(t &); t  &  z
= csn + (cs
   csn)(1  e s(& z))e s0(t &); t  &  z; (2)
where s0 > 0 is the parameter of speed of the de-sequestration process. The assumption s0 > s will
allow us to take into account the fact that the storage process is slower than the release process.
Let us assume rst that the only possible change of practice is from the usual to a sequestering
one (no possibility of return to the usual practice). The aggregate carbon stock stored in agricultural
soils at t is then dened by
CS(t) = csnB +
Z t
0
a(z)(cs(t; z)  csn)dz
= csnB + (cs
   csn)
Z t
0
a(z)(1  e s(t z))dz; (3)
where a(z) is the number of units of land that moved from the usual practice to a sequestering one
at date z. Feng et al. (2002) suppose that because of various technical and economic constraints, the
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number of units of land on which a change of practice can take place at each date is bounded from
above: a(z)  a 8z. To avoid unessential technical di¢ culties (see footnote 2), we make the stronger
assumption that a is a discrete variable that can only take the two values 0 and a: the number of
units of land on which the practice can change is either nil or maximum.
The fact that the change of practice can take place at di¤erent dates on di¤erent units of land
introduces an heterogeneity among the units, even if land is initially homogeneous. At date t; all the
units which have adopted a sequestering practice do not necessarily store the same amount of carbon,
the amount stored by each of them depending on the date of the change of practice.
Let us suppose now that a sequence usual practice / sequestering practice / usual practice is
possible. There exist for a given unit of land three conceivable congurations1 at date t:
 either it has been cultivated with the usual practice from the beginning, and the carbon stored
is csn ;
 or it has experienced a single change of practice at date z < t, and the carbon stored is cs(t; z)
given by equation (1);
 or it has experienced the two changes of practice, respectively at dates z and & with z < & < t;
and the carbon stored is cs(t; &; z) given by equation (2).
The calculation of the aggregate carbon stock is complicated because of the heterogeneity due to
the timing of sequestration. Nevertheless, in the case of the social optimum and under the assumption
of homogeneity of the land, the units of land which must come back to the usual practice are necessarily
those which have changed practice last (last in rst out principle). The benet of a return to the
usual practice on a given unit of land is indeed independant of the carbon stored in its soil. Besides,
the social damage due to this return is all the smaller since this carbon stock is low, which corresponds
to the last unit having changed practice. The aggregate stock then writes
CS(t) = csnB +
Z T 0
0
a(z)(cs(t; z)  csn)dz  
Z t
T 0
b(z)rs(t; z)dz;
with T 0 the date at which the carbon release begins and rs(t; z) the virtual releaseat date t in the
b(z) units of lands that went back to the usual practice at date z (cf. gure 1). Sequestration begins
in a given unit of land at date (z) and stops at date z: The amount of carbon stored in the soil
of this unit at this date is cs(z; (z)). The amount of carbon stored at date t is cs(t; z; (z)): If the
sequestering practice had continued until date t the sequestration would have been equal to cs(t; (z)):
The di¤erence between this virtual storage and the real one is rs(t; z): We then have
rs(t; z) = cs(t; (z))  cs(t; z; (z))
= (cs   csn)

(1  e s(t (z)))  (1  e s(z (z)))e s0(t z)

:
1We do not consider situations in which a unit of land would experience three successive changes of practice.
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Figure 1: Carbon storage and release
The last in rst out principle allows us to dene (z) byZ T 0
(z)
a()d =
Z z
T 0
b()d :
For the same reasons than in the case of a(t); we make the assumption that the number of units
of land that can go back to the usual practice at each date is either 0 or a: b(t) = f0; ag 8t.
The aggregate carbon stock sequestered in agricultural soils is nally:8>><>>:
CS(t) = csnB + (cs
   csn)
R t
0 a(z)(1  e s(t z))dz 8t  T 0
CS(t) = csnB + (cs
   csn)
R T 0
0 a(z)(1  e s(t z))dz
 (cs   csn)
R t
T 0 b(z)

(1  e s(t (z)))  (1  e s(z (z)))e s0(t z)

dz 8t > T 0;
(4)
and the corresponding ow of carbon emissions trapped at each date in the soils is:8>><>>:
F (t) = (cs   csn)s
R t
0 a(z)e
 s(t z)dz 8t  T 0
F (t) = (cs   csn)s
R T 0
0 a(z)e
 s(t z)dz
 (cs   csn)
R t
T 0 b(z)

se s(t (z)) + s0(1  e s(z (z)))e s0(t z)

dz 8t > T 0:
(5)
Finally, the stock of agricultural land cultivated with the sequestering practice at date t is:(
A(t) =
R t
0 a(z)dz 8t  T 0
A(t) =
R T 0
0 a(z)dz  
R t
T 0 b(z)dz 8t > T 0
(6)
with 0  A(t)  B; a(t) = f0; ag and b(t) = f0; ag 8t
3 The optimal solution
3.1 The social planners program
The social planner maximizes the total surplus associated to the emissions of carbon by the economic
activity, composed of the di¤erence between the benets of emissions and the sum of the costs of
carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and of the damage of climate change.
The carbon stock in the atmosphere is subject to a natural assimilation process at the constant rate
 > 0; besides, it is augmented by net emissions, equal to raw emissions E(t) minus emissions removed
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from the atmosphere by sequestration in agricultural soils F (t). The equation of accumulation of the
carbon stock is then
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t)  F (t); (7)
where F (t) is given by equation (5).
The initial carbon stock is given, S(0) = S0 > 0.
The benets of emissions are B(E(t)); with B0(E(t)) > 0 and B00(E(t))  0:
The damage function is D(S(t)); with D0(S(t)) > 0: We do not make any a priori assumption on
D00(S(t)): the marginal damage can be decreasing, constant or increasing.
The cost of sequestration is C(A(t)); with C 0(A(t)) > 0 and C 00(A(t)) > 0: This cost is an oppor-
tunity cost and also a cost associated to the new equipment that the change of practice requires.
The social discount rate is r; supposed constant.
The date at which carbon release begins to take place is T 0:
The social planner seeks to maximize (with ec = cs   csn)
maxV =
Z 1
0
e rt (B(E(t) D(S(t))  C(A(t)))dt;
subject to 8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t)  F (t)
_A(t) = a(t)  b(t)8>><>>:
F (t) = ecs R t0 a(z)e s(t z)dz 8t  T 0
F (t) = ecs R T 00 a(z)e s(t z)dz
 ec R tT 0 b(z)se s(t (z)) + s0(1  e s(z (z)))e s0(t z) dz 8t > T 0R T 0
(z) a()d =
R z
T 0 b()d
0  A(t)  B, a(t) = f0; ag and b(t) = f0; ag 8t
S(0) = S0 and A(0) = 0 given.
The ow of carbon stored in agricultural soils at instant t; F (t); is determined di¤erently depending
on the relevant stage: carbon storage (before T 0) or carbon release (after T 0). The problem is then a
two-stage optimal control problem. In order to solve it, we adapt to our case the method proposed by
Tomiyama (1985), Tomiyama and Rossana (1989) and Saglam (2002) for this type of problems. The
derivation of the rst order necessary conditions of optimality and of the matching conditions in the
general case is left to Appendix A.
3.2 Before T 0: sequestration
The social planner solves an optimization program in nite horizon, considering that the horizon T 0
and the value function of the program after T 0 V+(S(T 0); A(T 0)) are given. By denition of T 0; we
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have b(t) = 0 8t  T 0: The social planners program then writes8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
max
R T 0
0 e
 rt (B(E(t)) D(S(t))  C(A(t)))dt+ V+(S(T 0); A(T 0))
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t)  ecs R t0 a(z)e s(t z)dz
_A(t) = a(t)
0  A(t)  B and a(t) = f0; ag 8t
S(0) = S0, A(0) = 0 given.
(8)
We note 1  the shadow price of the carbon stock S and 2  the one of the land used for sequest-
ration A. The current value Hamiltonian of this program is then (see Appendix A):
H  = e rt (B(E(t)) D(S(t))  C(A(t))) + 1 (t) ( S(t) + E(t)) + 2 (t)a(t)
 ecsa(t)Z T 0
t
1 (z)e s(z t)dz: (9)
First of all, the Hamiltonian is linear in the control variable a(t): The coe¢ cient associated to a(t)
in the Hamiltonian is
(t) = 2 (t)  ecsZ T 0
t
1 (z)e s(z t)dz: (10)
It represents the di¤erence between the marginal benet of sequestration and its marginal cost.
The marginal benet is the sum of the ows of carbon sequestered until T 0 by an additional unit of
land devoted to sequestration at t; evaluated at the (negative) shadow value of the carbon stock 1 .
The marginal cost is the (negative) shadow price of the land used for sequestration 2 : As long as
this coe¢ cient (t) is positive, the benet of sequestration is greater than its cost and a(t) = a; when
the coe¢ cient becomes negative, a(t) = 02. It may happen that sequestration stops while (t) is still
positive, if all the lands suitable for sequestration are already used. The date T at which sequestration
stops can then be:
 T1 in the case of a corner solution, with A(T1) = B and (T1) > 0;
 T2 in the case of an interior solution, with A(T2) < B and (T2) = 0:
Besides, between 0 and T (equal to T1 or T2) we have _A(t) = a, which implies
A(t) =
(
at; t  T
A(T ) = aT; t 2 [T; T 0] : (11)
The rst order necessary conditions are (see Appendix A):
@H 
@E(t)
= 0, e rtB0(E(t)) + 1 (t) = 0; (12)
@H 
@S(t)
+ _1 (t) = 0,  e rtD0(S(t))  1 (t) + _1 (t) = 0; (13)
@H 
@A(t)
+ _2 (t) = 0,  e rtC 0(A(t)) + _2 (t) = 0: (14)
2Without the assumption that a(t) is a discrete variable, we could have had (t) = 0 for an interval of values of t;
that could not have been reduced to the single value T: Feng et al. (2002) obtain this kind of solution. This would have
been untractable in our problem.
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Equations (12) and (13) allow us to obtain the growth rate of emissions:
_E(t)
E(t)
=   B
0(E(t))
E(t)B00(E(t))

D0(S(t))
B0(E(t))
  (r + )

: (15)
Besides, the equation of accumulation of the carbon stock is
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t)  F (t); (16)
with
F (t) = eca(  1  e st ; 0  t  T
e st
 
esT   1 ; T  t  T 0: (17)
These two dynamic equations allow us to obtain E(t) and S(t) 8t 2 [0; T 0] ; as functions of E(0) and
T which are still unknown.
Using equation (11), equation (14) integrates into:
2 (t) =
(
2 (0) +
R t
0 e
 rzC 0(A(z))dz; 0  t  T;
2 (T )  C
0(A(T ))
r
 
e rt   e rT  ; T  t  T 0: (18)
It is now possible to calculate (T ); using equations (10), (12) and (18):
(T ) = 2 (0) +
Z T
0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz + ecsesT Z T 0
T
e (r+s)zB0(E(z))dz; (19)
where T 0; 2 (0) and E(z) are still unknown.
3.3 After T 0: de-sequestration
T 0 is by denition the date at which de-sequestration begins. Then a(t) = 0 8t  T 0.
The values of the stocks S(T 0) and A(T 0)  B are taken as given and constitute the initial
conditions of the problem after T 0. The social planners program writes8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
maxV+ =
R1
T 0 e
 rt (B(E(t)) D(S(t))  C(A(t)))dt
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t)  F (t)
_A(t) =  b(t)
F (t) = ecs R T 00 a(z)e s(t z)dz   ec R tT 0 b(z)se s(t (z)) + s0(1  e s(z (z)))e s0(t z) dzR T 0
(z) a()d =
R z
T 0 b()d
0  A(t)  B and b(t) = f0; ag 8t
S(T 0) and A(T 0) given.
(20)
Let 1+ be the shadow price of S and 2+ the one of A. The current value Hamiltonian of this
problem is then (see Appendix A):
H+ = e rt (B(E(t)) D(S(t))  C(A(t)))
+1+(t)
 
 S(t) + E(t)  ecsZ T 0
0
a(z)e s(t z)dz
!
  2+(t)b(t)
+ecb(t)Z 1
t
1+(z)

se s(z (t)) + s0(1  e s(t (t)))e s0(z t)

dz: (21)
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The Hamiltonian is linear in the control variable b(t). The coe¢ cient associated to b(t) is
(t) =  2+(t) + ecZ 1
t
1+(z)

se s(z (t)) + s0(1  e s(t (t)))e s0(z t)

dz: (22)
It is the di¤erence between the marginal benet and the marginal cost associated to carbon release.
The marginal benet is the opposite of the (negative) shadow price of the land used for sequestration
2+. The marginal cost is the sum of the ows of carbon released from t to innity by an additional
unit of land returning to the usual practice at t; evaluated at the (negative) shadow value of the carbon
stock 1+. As long as this coe¢ cient (t) is positive, the benet of de-sequestration is greater than its
cost and b(t) = a; when it becomes negative, carbon release stops and b(t) = 0. It may happen that
release stops before (t) becomes negative, if all the units of land that have been used for sequestration
are back to the usual practice. Let T 00 be the date at which de-sequestration stops. Between T 0 and
T 00; we have _A(t) =  a and then
A(t) = A(T 0)  a(t  T 0) = a(T + T 0   t); T 0  t  T 00:
As we have just pointed out, two congurations may occur:
 If  never becomes negative after T 0; carbon release takes place until all land used for sequest-
ration has returned to the usual practice. Date T 001 is dened as the date at which this happens:
A(T 001 ) = 0, T 001 = T + T 0:
 If there exists a date at which  becomes negative, this date is denoted T 002 (with T 0 < T 002 < T 001 ).
We then have (T 002 ) = 0 and b(t) = 0 and A(t) = A(T 002 ) 8t  T 002 :
Notice that we have, for t 2 [T 0; T 00] :Z T
(t)
a(z)dz =
Z t
T 0
b(z)dz , a
Z T
(t)
dz = a
Z t
T 0
dz;
which allows us to obtain (t):
(t) = T + T 0   t: (23)
We show in Appendix A that the rst order necessary conditions for an interior solution are:
@H+
@E(t)
= 0, e rtB0(E(t)) + 1+(t) = 0; (24)
@H+
@S(t)
+ _1+(t) = 0,  e rtD0(S(t))  1+(t) + _1+(t) = 0; (25)
@H+
@A(t)
+ _2+(t) = 0,  e rtC 0(A(t)) + _2+(t) = 0; (26)
while the transversality conditions write
lim
t!11+(t)S(t) = 0; (27)
lim
t!12+(t)A(t) = 0: (28)
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Equations (24) and (25) allow us to obtain, as in the rst stage of the problem, the growth rate of
emissions:
_E(t)
E(t)
=   B
0(E(t))
E(t)B00(E(t))

D0(S(t))
B0(E(t))
  (r + )

: (29)
Besides, the equation of accumulation of the carbon stock still writes
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t)  F (t); (30)
but the ow of carbon sequestered in agricultural soils is now (using equation (5) and (z) = T+T 0 z) :
F (t) = ecae st  esT   1  eca (31)(
e s(t T )(1  e s(t T 0)) + (1  e s0(t T 0))  s0s0 2ses(T+T
0)e s0t(e(s0 2s)t   e(s0 2s)T 0); T 0  t  T 00
e s(t T )(1  e s(T 00 T 0)) + e s0t(es0T 00   es0T 0)  s0s0 2ses(T+T
0)e s0t(e(s0 2s)T 00   e(s0 2s)T 0); t  T 00
The two dynamic equations allow us to obtain E(t) and S(t) 8t 2 [T 0;1[ ; as functions of E(T 0);
S(T 0); T and T 00 which are still unknown.
With
A(t) =
(
a(T + T 0   t); T 0  t  T 00;
A(T 00) = a(T + T 0   T 00); t  T 00; (32)
equation (26) integrates into
2+(t) =
(
2+(T
0) +
R t
T 0 e
 rzC 0(A(z))dz; T 0  t  T 00;
2+(T
00)  C0(A(T 00))r

e rt   e rT 00

; t  T 00: (33)
We then have
2+(t) = 2+(T
0) +
Z T 00
T 0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz   C
0(A(T 00))
r

e rt   e rT 00

; t  T 00;
which implies
lim
t!12+(t) = 2+(T
0) +
Z T 00
T 0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz +
C 0(A(T 00))
r
e rT
00
:
We will see below that the economy reaches in the long term a stationary state, where emissions,
carbon stock and land used for sequestration are constant. Then, the transversality condition (28)
implies that limt!1 2+(t) = 0; and the previous equation allows us to write
2+(T
0) =  
Z T 00
T 0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz   C
0(A(T 00))
r
e rT
00
: (34)
We nally have
2+(t) =
(
  R T 00t e rzC 0(A(z))dz   C0(A(T 00))r e rT 00 ; T 0  t  T 00;
 C0(A(T 00))r e rt; t  T 00:
(35)
It is now possible to calculate (T 00); using equations (22), (35), (24) and (z) = T + T 0   z:
(T 00) =
C 0(A(T 00))
r
e rT
00 ecZ 1
T 00
e rz

se s(z (T+T
0 T 00)) + s0(1  e s(2T 00 (T+T 0)))e s0(z T 00)

B0(E(z))dz;
(36)
where T and T 0 are still unknown.
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3.4 The matching conditions
We show in Appendix A that the matching conditions between the two stages of the problem write,
in the case of an interior solution 0 < T 0 <1:
1 (T
0) = 1+(T
0) (37)
2 (T
0) = 2+(T
0) (38)
H 

T 0 +
Z T 0
0
@H 
@T 0
dt = H+

T 0  
Z 1
T 0
@H+
@T 0
dt: (39)
In the case of a corner solution the last one of this conditions becomes an inequality. If the left-hand
side of the inequality is greater than the right-hand side, the optimal solution is to sequester carbon in
the agricultural soils permanently: T 0 !1: If the LHS is smaller than the RHS, the optimal solution
is T 0 = 0 and then T = 0: it is never optimal to begin storing carbon in agricultural soils.
Using equations (12) and (24), equation (37) reduces to
E(T 0 ) = E(T
0
+); (40)
which means that there is no jump in the emissions path at the switching time T 0.
Using equations (18) and (34), equation (38) writes
2 (0) =  
Z T
0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz   C
0(A(T ))
r

e rT   e rT 0

 
Z T 00
T 0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz   C
0(A(T 00))
r
e rT
00
: (41)
We have, using equation (9),
H 

T 0 +
Z T 0
0
@H 
@T 0
dt = e rT
0  
B(E(T 0)) D(S(T 0))  C(A(T 0))+ 1 (T 0)   S(T 0) + E(T 0)
+2 (T 0)a(T 0)  ecs1 (T 0)Z T 0
0
a(t)e s(T
0 t)dt;
and, using equation (21),
H+

T 0  
Z 1
T 0
@H+
@T 0
dt = e rT
0  
B(E(T 0)) D(S(T 0))  C(A(T 0))
+1+(T
0)
 
 S(T 0) + E(T 0)  ecsZ T 0
0
a(z)e s(T
0 z)dz
!
  2+(T 0)b(T 0)
+ecb(T 0)Z 1
T 0
1+(z)

se s(z (T
0)) + s0(1  e s(T 0 (T 0)))e s0(z T 0)

dz
+ecsa(T 0)Z 1
T 0
1+(t)e
 s(t T 0)dt
 ecZ 1
T 0
b(t)
Z 1
t
1+(z)
@
@T 0

se s(z (t)) + s0(1  e s(t (t)))e s0(z t)

dz

dt:
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We have a(T 0) = 0 and b(t) = a 8t 2 [T 0; T 00] : After taking into account the rst two matching
conditions and simplifying, the last matching condition reduces to
0 =  2+(T 0) + ecZ 1
T 0
1+(z)

se s(z T ) + s0(1  e s(T 0 T ))e s0(z T 0)

dz
 ecZ T 00
T 0
Z 1
t
1+(z)se
 s(t (T+T 0))(se sz   s0e(s0 s)t s0z)dz

dt:
This equation can be simplied by changing the order of integration in the last integral and rearranging:
0 =  2+(T 0) + ec2s(s0   s)
s0   2s e
s(T+T 0)
Z 1
T 0
1+(z)e
 2szdz (42)
+ecs0es0T 0 1  s0   s
s0   2se
 s(T 0 T )
Z 1
T 0
1+(z)e
 s0zdz; (43)
2+(T
0) being given by equation (34) and 1+(z) by equation (24). This last matching equation allows
us to calculate T 0 as a function of T and T 00:
3.5 The optimal dates
It is now possible to nd the optimal dates T; T 0 and T 00; in the di¤erent congurations that can
occur. In every conguration, these dates must obviously satisfy the following inequality:
0  T  B
a
 T 0  T 00  T + T 0: (44)
Any meaningful combination of the di¤erent solutions below can take place.
 Interior solution
The date T at which sequestration stops is T2 < Ba ; given by (T ) = 0; i.e., according to
equations (19) and (41):
C 0(A(T ))
r

e rT   e rT 0

+
Z T 00
T 0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz +
C 0(A(T 00))
r
e rT
00
=
ecsesT Z T 0
T
e (r+s)zB0(E(z))dz: (45)
The date T 00 at which de-sequestration stops is T 002 < T + T 0; given by (T 00) = 0; i.e., according
to equation (36):
C 0(A(T 00))
r
e rT
00
= ecse s(T 00 (T+T 0)) Z 1
T 00
e (r+s)zB0(E(z))dz
+ecs0(1  e s(2T 00 (T+T 0)))es0T 00 Z 1
T 00
e (r+s
0)zB0(E(z))dz: (46)
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The date T 0 at which de-sequestration begins is given by equation (42):Z T 00
T 0
e rzC 0(A(z))dz +
C 0(A(T 00))
r
e rT
00
=
ec2s(s0   s)
s0   2s e
s(T+T 0)
Z 1
T 0
e (r+2s)zB0(E(z))dz
+ecs0es0T 0 1  s0   s
s0   2se
 s(T 0 T )
Z 1
T 0
e (r+s
0)zB0(E(z))dz: (47)
 Corner solution after T 0
The date T 00 at which de-sequestration stops becomes T 001 = T + T 0:
 Corner solution before T 0
The date T at which sequestration stops becomes T1 = Ba :
 Corner solution for T 0
It may happen that it is never optimal to begin to store carbon (T 0 = 0) or that it is never
optimal to release carbon in the atmosphere (T 0 !1). In these two cases, the third matching
condition (42) is no longer veried. As far as its left hand side is nil, the solution T 0 ! 1
prevails if the RHS is negative, and T 0 = 0 if it is positive.
It is not possible to solve explicitly and nd the optimal dates in the general case that we study
here. We will then use below specic functional forms and simulations.
3.6 The stationary state
This economy can admit two di¤erent steady states, according to the solution that prevails: no carbon
release (formally, T 0 ! 1 or T 00 = T 0 < 1) and de-sequestration (T 0 < 1, T 00 > T 0). In the two
cases, the ow of carbon sequestered, the carbon stock and the emissions are given by:
F  = 0; (48)
S =
E

; (49)
D0(
E

) = (r + )B0(E); (50)
but the stock of land devoted to sequestration is di¤erent in the two cases:
A =
(
A(T ) if T 0 !1 or T 00 = T 0;
A(T 00) if T 0 <1 and T 00 > T 0:
Equations (49) and (50) show that the steady state values of emissions and carbon stock are
independant of the choices made about carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. Sequestration only
a¤ects the dynamics to reach the steady state.
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We now study this dynamics. The dynamic system writes:(
_E(t) = 1B00(E(t)) ((r + )B
0(E(t)) D0(S(t)))
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t)  F (t); (51)
with limt!1 F (t) = 0 (cf. equations (17) and (31)).
Because of this last property, the dynamic system is asymptotically autonomous. Following Ben-
aïm and Hirsch (1996), we rst study the corresponding autonomous system and then examine the
converging properties of the asymptotically autonomous system towards the autonomous one.
The autonomous system is(
_E(t) = 1B00(E(t)) ((r + )B
0(E(t)) D0(S(t)))
_S(t) =  S(t) + E(t); (52)
and its Jacobian matrix is
J =
 
r +   D00(S)B00(E)
1  
!
:
We have (
trJ = r > 0
det J =  (r + ) + D00(S)B00(E) :
If D00(S)  0 (constant or increasing marginal damage of carbon emissions), det J < 0; the stationary
state is then a saddle-point. It is still the case when the marginal damage is decreasing but not too
much, i.e. when D
00(S)
B00(E) < (r + ):
A simple look at equations (17) and (31) is su¢ cient to convince us that F (t) decreases at an
asymptotic rate e s when there is no carbon release, and at an asymptotic rate e  sup(s;s0) when there
is some carbon release. Then, the solution of the dynamic system (51) converges to the solution of
the autonomous system (52) at an asymptotic rate at least as fast as e s in the rst case, e  sup(s;s0)
in the second one3. Moreover, since (51) converges asymptotically to (52), both will have the same
local stability properties, and (51) will be saddle-point stable under the same conditions as (52).
4 Numerical analysis
4.1 The optimal dates
We suppose that the costs of sequestration are quadratic, the benet of emissions log-linear, and the
damage linear:
C(A(t)) =

2
A(t)2;  > 0; (53)
B(E(t)) =  lnE(t);  > 0; (54)
3The proof is directly derived from the results in Benaïm and Hirsch (1996), and thus will be omitted here.
16
D (S(t)) =  S(t);  > 0: (55)
Whereas the rst two assumptions do not constraint heavily the results, the assumption of a
constant marginal damage is essential because it allows us to nd an explicit solution to the problem.
According to equations (15) and (29) we have, both before and after T 0;
_E(t)
E(t)
=
 

E(t)  (r + ): (56)
Besides, we know that emissions do not jump at T 0: The previous dynamic equation is unstable and
so emissions take from the beginning their stationary value:
E(t) = E =
(r + )
 
8t: (57)
Along the whole path, emissions are constant and independant of the choices made otherwise
about carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. They are naturally all the higher since the benets
are high, the interest and absorption rates are high and the marginal damage is low. This property of
constancy of emissions along the optimal path greatly simplies the resolution of the model and the
determination of the optimal dates.
It implies immediately
1 (t) =    
r + 
e rt; t 2 0; T 0 ; (58)
1+(t) =    
r + 
e rt; t 2 T 0;+1 : (59)
In the case of an interior solution, dates T2, T 002 and T 0 are respectively given by equations (45),
(46) and (47), which can be written here as
aT
r
+
a
r2

e r(T
00 T )   e r(T 0 T )

=
ecs 
(r + )(r + s)

1  e (r+s)(T 0 T )

; (60)
a(T + T 0   T 00)
r
=
ecs0 
(r + )(r + s0)

1  r(s
0   s)
s0(r + s)
e s(2T
00 (T+T 0))

; (61)
aT
r
  a
r2

1  e r(T 00 T 0)

=
ecs0 
(r + )(r + s0)

1  r(s
0   s)
s0(r + s)
e s(T
0 T )

+
ecs r(s0   s)
(r + )(r + 2s)(r + s)(r + s0)
e s(T
0 T )

1  e (r+2s)(T 00 T 0)

: (62)
These dates are independent of the characteristics of the benet function: emission and sequest-
ration choices are disconnected.
It is impossible to rule out a priori the possibility of multiple solutions (interior and corner ones)
i.e. of local optima. To discriminate between them we will, in the numerical simulations, compute the
total value function (V  + V+).
We can go further in the analyical resolution when de-sequestration is faster than sequestration
(s0  s). We show in Appendix B that an interior solution cannot exist, and that two di¤erent corner
solutions can occur.
17
 The rst one implies T 00 = T 0; which means that de-sequestration stops exactly at the moment
at which it begins, or in other words that de-sequestration never occurs. We can then nd the
value of the optimal T2: eT2 = ecs r
a(r + )(r + s)
: (63)
eT2 must be less than Ba 4. eT2 is all the higher since the benet in terms of sequestration given by
the change of practice ec is high, the marginal damage  is high, the direct cost of sequestration
 and the adjustment cost a are low, and the absorption rate  is low. Moreover, it is possible
to show that eT2 is an increasing function of the interest rate r if and only if s > r2: eT2 is
independent of the value of the speed of de-sequestration s0 (with s0  s): in this case, the
dissymmetry of the sequestration process does not a¤ect the optimal solution.
Finally, eT2 is an increasing function of the speed of absorption s, and we have
lim
s!1
eT2 = ec r
a(r + )
: (64)
When we do not take into account the dynamics of sequestration, as in Feng et al. (2002),
this date is the optimal date at which sequestration stops. We have lims!1
eT2eT2 = 1 + rs : the
error (overvaluation of the optimal period of sequestration) made by ignoring the dynamics of
sequestration can be very signicant.
 The second one is T 001 = T2+T 0: de-sequestration occurs until all land had returned to the usual
practice. In this case, the optimal dates cannot be obtained explicitely.
It is impossible to nd analytically which solution is the optimal one. We will compute in the
numerical simulations the total value function V  + V+ to discriminate between the two solutions, in
the special case of our calibration.
4.2 Numerical simulations
4.2.1 Calibration
The numerical simulations are performed using the values of the parameters given in the table below.
According to FAO data5, the total agricultural land in the world is about 5 billion ha, and the
total arable land and land under permanent crop is about 1.5 billion ha. Of this, we suppose that 1
billion ha can be used to store carbon (B = 1000 Mha). We also suppose that each year a change
of practice can take place on 10 Mha (a = 10 Mha), which means that the conversion of the total
disposable land to carbon sequestration would take 100 years.
The initial stock of carbon in the atmosphere is 370 ppmv (or about 778 GtC), the 2001 level.
The model is calibrated to obtain a long term stock of 450 ppmv (or about 947.25 GtC). For a rate of
decay equal to 0.0125 (which means that the average life of carbon in the atmosphere is 1=0:0125 = 80
4The solution is a corner solution before T 0; (T1; T 0; T 002 = T
0); if and only if ecs r
a(r+)(r+s)
 B
a
:
5Source: FAOSTAT database of Land Use Statistics.
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Parameter Value
a 10 Mha/y
B 1000 Mha
~c 0:015 GtC/Mha
S0 370 ppmv
s 0:02
 0:0125
r 0:03
 105
 1
 13235500
years), this requires stationary emissions of 450  0:0125 = 5:625 ppmv. As E = (r+) we must
have, if we choose r = 3% per year,  =
5:625
0:0425 = 132:355.
According to the data reported in INRA (2002), a good estimation of the additional carbon that
can be stored in agricultural land in France seems to be 15 tC/ha. Even if this value can be di¤erent
from one geographical area to another, we take here ec = 0:015 GtC/Mha.
The same study for France allows us to evaluate the speeds of sequestration and de-sequestration:
s = 0:02 and s0 = 0:037:
Finally, as units for total costs, benets and damage are arbitrary, we take  = 1: We then choose
the decomposition between  and  ; satisfying the constraint  = 132:355; such that the optimal date
at which sequestration stops in the case s = s0 =1; given by equation (64), is signicantly positive.
With  = 105 this date is around 20 years. We then have  = 132:355 105:
4.2.2 Results
When the speed of de-sequestration is higher than the speed of sequestration, the optimal solution
always consists in storing carbon in agricultural soils permanently, without any release (gure 2). If
the speed of de-sequestration was lower, it would be optimal to store carbon during a longer period
of time and then release some carbon. For s = 0:02 and s0 = 0:01 for instance, carbon is stored in
the soils during about 30 years, then release begins immediately and stops 12 years or so later. For
s = 0:02 and 8s0 > s; the computation of the total value function shows that the optimal solution is
the rst corner solution (T = T 0 = T 00). Carbon is stored during about 20 years and never released.
These results can be explained intuitively. If carbon release is a very slow process (slower than
storage), de-sequestration induces an immediate benet as the cost associated to sequestration dis-
appears, while the damage will appear only gradually. The parameter s0 acts as a discount rate
concerning the damage. However, physical data of the sequestration process (s0 > s) rule out this
kind of solution. Then, when de-sequestration is fast, it is never optimal to release carbon after having
stored it. Optimal sequestration is permanent.
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Figure 2: The optimal dates
With the assumption s = s0 =1; in other terms when the dynamics of sequestation is ignored (case
studied by Feng et al. (2002)), the optimal sequestration is equivalent to half the physical potential
sequestration (T = 50 years , A = 500 Mha). Whereas this optimal e¤ort corresponds to the fth of
the potential (T = 20 years , A = 200 Mha) for speeds of sequestration and de-sequestration close
to the empirical French ones (s = 0:02 and s0 = 0:03): We see that the error made when not taking
into account the dynamics of sequestration is very signicant, with an error coe¢ cient (1 + rs) of 2:5
for our calibration.
Figures 3 and 4 show respectively the ow of carbon emissions trapped and the additional carbon
stock stored when we assume that these last values of s and s0 are good proxis for the world conditions
and for these two sequestration e¤orts (T = 50 and T = 20).
Figure 3: Flow of carbon trapped
Figure 4: Additional carbon stock
sequestered
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The additional carbon stock sequestered converges to a steady level of 7.5 GtC when we dont take
the dynamics of the physical process into consideration in the determination of the optimal policy
(T = 50), while the optimal long term level is only 3 GtC (T = 20). The omission of the dynamic
process leads to a very signicant over-sequestration.
5 Conclusion
This paper takes explicitely into account the temporality of sequestration. Its rst contribution is
technical. We solve an optimal control problem with two stages and a dissymmetric dynamic process.
The second contribution is empirical. We show that the error made when sequestration is supposed
immediate can be very signicant. We also exhibit numerically the optimal path of sequestation,
which must be permanent if sequestration is faster than de-sequestration, for specic benet, damage
and cost functions, and a calibration that mimics roughly the world conditions.
Interesting extensions would consist in considering factors that could make the optimal sequestation
temporary, even in the case of a release faster than storage, like technical progress in abatement, or
technical progress in usual practices and not in sequestering practices, that could increase the cost of
sequestration.
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A The two-stage optimal control problem with an integral equation
of motion
The optimal control problem we study here has two distinctive features: (i) the accumulation of the
state variable is dissymmetric and we must determine the switching point between the two stages
of accumulation and desaccumulation; (ii) the motion of the state variable depends on the integral
of a function of the past values of the control. The question is to check how to dene properly
the Hamiltonian function corresponding to this problem, and how to write the rst order necessary
conditions and the matching conditions. We use a method close to the one developped in Saglam
(2002) for a technology adoption problem.
A.1 Problem before T 0
maxV  =
Z T 0
0
F (C(t);K(t); t)dt+ V +(K(T
0); T 0)
_K(t) = f (C(t);K(t); t) +
Z t
0
g (C(z); t; z)dz; 0  t < T 0
K(0) = K0 given, K(T 0) free,
where K is the vector of state variables, C the vector of control variables, and T 0 the switching time.
Notice that this switching time appears explicitly in the equation of motion of the state variable.
The Lagrangian of this problem is
  = V  +
Z T 0
0
 (t)

f (C(t);K(t); t) +
Z t
0
g (C(z); t; z)dz   _K(t)

dt;
or, after changing the order of integration in the second term of the integral and integrating by parts
the third one:
  =
Z T 0
0
F (C(t);K(t); t)dt+
Z T 0
0
 (t)f (C(t);K(t); t)dt
+
Z T 0
0
 Z T 0
t
 (z)g (C(t); z; t)dz
!
dt
    (T 0)K(T 0)   (0)K(0)+ Z T 0
0
_ (t)K(t)dt
+V +(K(T
0); T 0):
Let the Hamiltonian be dened by
H (C(t);K(t); t; T 0) = F (C(t);K(t); t) +  (t)f (C(t);K(t); t)
+
Z T 0
t
 (z)g (C(t); z; t)dz:
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Then we can write
  =
Z T 0
0

H  + _ (t)K(t)

dt    (T 0)K(T 0)   (0)K(0)+ V +(K(T 0); T 0):
Let (C(t);K(t)) be an optimal path 8t 2 [0; T 0[ and T 0 2 [0;1[ : We perturb the C(t) path
by an arbitrary C(t); it generates, through the equation of motion, a perturbation of the K(t)
path and of the optimal switching time T 0 : C(t) = C(t) + "C(t); K(T 0) = K(T 0) + "K(T 0),
T 0 = T 0 + "T 0 (Saglam (2002)).
We then have
@ 
@"
=

H jT 0 + _ (T 0)K(T 0)

T 0 +
Z T 0
0

@H 
@C(t)
C(t) +
@H 
@K(t)
K(t) +
@H 
@T 0
T 0

dt
+
Z T 0
0
_ (t)K(t)dt   (T 0)K(T 0)  _ (T 0)K(T 0)T 0
+
@V +
@K(T 0)
K(T 0) +
@V +
@T 0
T 0
=
 
H jT 0 +
Z T 0
0
@H 
@T 0
dt+
@V +
@T 0
!
T 0 +
Z T 0
0
@H 
@C(t)
C(t)dt
+
Z T 0
0

@H 
@K(t)
+ _ (t)

K(t)dt+

@V +
@K(T 0)
   (T 0)

K(T 0):
Each component of this derivative must be equal to zero. This allows us to write the usual rst
order necessary conditions and the matching conditions:
 rst order necessary conditions:
@H 
@C(t)
= 0
@H 
@K(t)
+ _ (t) = 0
 matching conditions:
H jT 0 +
Z T 0
0
@H 
@T 0
dt+
@V +
@T 0
= 0
@V +
@K(T 0)
   (T 0) = 0:
A.2 Problem after T 0
maxV+ =
Z 1
T 0
F+(C(t);K(t); t)dt
_K(t) = f+(C(t);K(t); t; T
0) +
Z t
T 0
g+(C(z); t; z; T
0)dz; T 0  t
K(T 0) given.
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Lagrangian of this problem:
+ = V+ +
Z 1
T 0
+(t)

f+(C(t);K(t); t; T
0) +
Z t
T 0
g+(C(z); t; z; T
0)dz   _K(t)

dt
= V+ +
Z 1
T 0
+(t)f+(C(t);K(t); t; T
0)dt+
Z 1
T 0
Z 1
t
+(z)g+(C(t); z; t; T
0)dz

dt
 

lim
t!1+(t)K(t)  +(T
0)K(T 0)

+
Z 1
T 0
_+(t)K(t)dt:
Denition of the Hamiltonian:
H+(C(t);K(t); t; T 0) = F+(C(t);K(t); t) + +(t)f+(C(t);K(t); t; T 0) +
Z 1
t
+(z)g+(C(t); z; t; T
0)dz:
First order necessary conditions:
@H+
@C(t)
= 0
@H+
@K(t)
+ _+(t) = 0:
We can write the objective as
+ =
Z 1
T 0

H+ + _+(t)K(t)

dt 

lim
t!1+(t)K(t)  +(T
0)K(T 0)

:
Besides, we have
dV +
dT 0
=
@V +
@K(T 0)
@K(T 0)
@T 0
+
@V +
@T 0
;
with
dV +
dT 0
=
d+
dT 0
=   H+

T 0   _

+(T
0)K(T 0) +
Z 1
T 0
@H+
@T 0
dt+ +(T
0)
@K(T 0)
@T 0
+ _

+(T
0)K(T 0):
So we can write
@V +
@K(T 0)
= +(T
0)
@V +
@T 0
=   H+

T 0 +
Z 1
T 0
@H+
@T 0
dt:
Finally, the matching conditions can be written as follows:
 (T
0) = +(T
0)
H jT 0 +
Z T 0
0
@H 
@T 0
dt = H+

T 0  
Z 1
T 0
@H+
@T 0
dt:
Transversality condition:
lim
t!1+(t)K(t) = 0:
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A.3 Application
The previous results are applied to our problem, with the following denition of the variables and
functions:
C(t) =
 
E(t)
a(t)
!
; K(t) =
 
S(t)
A(t)
!
;
F (C(t);K(t); t) = e rt (B(E(t)) D(S(t))  C(A(t)))
f1 (C(t);K(t); t) =  S(t) + E(t)
f2 (C(t);K(t); t) = a(t)
g1 (C(z); t; z) =  ecsa(z)e s(t z)
g2 (C(z); t; z) = 0
F+(C(t);K(t); t) = F (C(t);K(t); t)
f1+(C(t);K(t); t; T
0) =  S(t) + E(t)  ecsZ T 0
0
a(z)e s(t z)dz
f2+(C(t);K(t); t; T
0) =  b(t)
g1+(C(z); t; z; T
0) = ecb(z)se s(t (z)) + s0(1  e s(z (z)))e s0(t z)
g2+(C(z); t; z; T
0) = 0:
B Analytical solution for the specic functional forms when s0  s
B.1 Interior solution
We rst show that there is no interior solution for s0  s:
Equations (61) and (62) imply
 a(T
00   T 0)
r
+
a
r2

1  e r(T 00 T 0)

=
ec s0
(r + )(r + s0)

1  r(s
0   s)
s0(r + s)
e s(2T
00 T T 0)

  ec s0
(r + )(r + s0)

1  r(s
0   s)
s0(r + s)
e s(T
0 T )

  ecs r(s0   s)
(r + )(r + 2s)(r + s)(r + s0)
e s(T
0 T )

1  e (r+2s)(T 00 T 0)

;
which can be written, with X = T 00   T 0  0; F (X) = 1   e rX   rX and G(X) = 1   e 2sX  
s
r+2s
 
1  e (r+2s)X ;
a
r2
F (X) =
ec r(s0   s)
(r + )(r + s)(r + s0)
e s(T
0 T )G(X):
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The LHS of this equality has the same sign as F (X); and the sign of the RHS depends on the sign
of s0   s and G(X):
We show easily that F (X)  0 and G(X)  0 8X  0 : F (0) = 0 and F 0(X) = r(e rX   1) < 0
8X > 0; G(0) = 0 and G0(X) = se 2sX(2  e rX) > 0 8X  0:
When s0 > s; the only solution is then X = 0 i.e. T 00 = T 0. For s0 = s the equality reduces to
F (X) = 0; and the only solution is again T 00 = T 0.
For s0  s and T 00 = T 0; equations (61) and (62) become identical. The optimal dates T and T 0
are then solution of the system composed of this last equation and (60):8<:
aT
r =
ec s
(r+)(r+s)

1  e (r+s)(T 0 T )

aT
r =
ec s0
(r+)(r+s0)

1  r(s0 s)s0(r+s)e s(T
0 T )

:
The elimination of aTr between these two equations yields
r(s0   s)
r + s0

1  e s(T 0 T )

=  se (r+s)(T 0 T );
which is impossible for T 0 2 [T;1[ since the LHS is positive and the RHS strictly negative.
B.2 Corner solutions
We now examine the corner solutions.
There can rst exist a corner solution before T 0: Then, equations (61) and (62) are valid and imply
as before T 00 = T 0; i.e. no de-sequestration. The date T at which sequestration stops can take two
values: T 0 or Ba :
If T = T 0; (61) and (62) become identical and allow us to obtain
~T2 =
ec sr
a(r + )(r + s)
:
We obtain the same value ~T2 for a corner solution both before and after T 0 (T = T 0 = T 00).
This solution is valid as long as ~T2 < Ba , i.e. as long as
ec sr
(r+)(r+s) < B.
If T = Ba ; we have
e sT
0
= e s
B
a

(r + )(r + s)(r + s0)ec s0r(s  s0)   s0(r + s)r(s  s0)

;
which requires B < ec s0r(r+)(r+s0) . The solutions T = Ba and T = ~T2 can coexist for ec sr(r+)(r+s) < B <ec s0r
(r+)(r+s0) . The corner solution before T
0 (T = Ba ) and T
00 = T 0 gives the same result.
There can also exist a corner solution after T 0, T 001 = T2 + T 0; but in this case we cannot obtain
the optimal dates analytically.
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